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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
REUEL CHRISTENSEN (John McAllister substituted), Administrator of
of the Estate of James A. Rasmussen,
deceased, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
13663

ELLSWORTH W. RASMUSSEN, also
known as WANLASS RASMUSSEN
OR W A N R A S M U S S E N and
BLANCHE RASMUSSEN, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants. J
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs as Administrator and Guardian of the Estates (hereinafter Administrator) of James A. and Sarah
E. Rasmussen sued alleging certain transfers (of real
property, grazing permits, waivers and sales) to defendants were either forgeries or a result of undue influence,
fraud, and coercion, and therefore void.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs-Respondents' Motion for New Trial was
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granted and the trial court held that the Administrator of
the two estates was, as opposed to defendants, entitled to
possession of the real property and grazing permits,
awarded the Administrator money damages and enjoined
the defendants from asserting any claim or interest to
said property except as defendant Ellsworth Wanlass
Rasmussen is an heir and legatee of the estate.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment and decree of the trial court should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of his death on December 13,1965, James
A. Rasmussen left surviving him his wife Sarah Eta Rasmussen, and his seven children: Ruby R. Hill, Clinton
D. Rasmussen, Ward B. Rasmussen, Alta R. Nielsen, the
defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen, Kenneth P.
Rasmussen and Roger J. Rasmussen. His wife, Sarah
Rasmussen died in April, 1967.
James A. and Sarah E. Rasmussen were for many
years residents of Ephraim, Sanpete County, State of
Utah. He had owned real property in Ephraim and
meadow land west of Ephraim. Mr. Rasmussen had also
raised hay and cattle, and had ranged his cattle on federal forest land pursuant to forest permits.
One of the children, defendant Ellsworth Wanless
Rasmussen claims that in 1963 and again shortly before
his death in 1965, that his father and mother (James A.
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and Sarah E. Rasmussen) transferred to him, certain
tracts of land, grazing permits, and cattle which transfers
the plaintiff-respondent Administrator refuses to recognize as valid.
In late 1962 and early 1963, the defendant Ellsworth
Wanlass and his brother Roger, decided as a joint venture to buy the cattle which were to be sold as part of
the so called Bagnell Estate. In seeking to assist the
defendant Ellsworth Wanless, Mr. Rasmussen, at the request of his son, the defendant Ellsworth Wanlass, deeded
10 acres to said defendant for the purpose of permitting
him to use the land as security. Sometime after the proposed purchase of the cattle had fallen through, Clinton
and Roger testified that Mr. Rasmussen had told them
that he had tried to get his son Ellsworth Wanlass to
deed the land back, but he had refused (TV. Vol. I pages
68-69). The Administrator alleged that this conveyance
from James A. and Sarah Rasmussen was made as an
accommodation to the defendant Ellsworth Wanlass and
was meant to assist him in obtaining financing with the
express agreement and understanding that the property
would be reconveyed at his request.
Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen disputes this and,
while admitting that the conveyance arose out of an
attempt to get a loan, claims that it was his father's intention to give him the property outright (Tr. Vol. I
pages 28-29). It is not disputed, however, that until his
death Mr. Rasmussen continued in his possession of this
land, caring for it, cropping it and paying the taxes
thereon.
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In November of 1965, Mr. Rasmussen became seriously ill and was admitted to a Provo hospital and was
discharged on November 11, 1965. His son, Clinton, testified that his father had told him on the way home from
the hospital that his son Ellsworth Wanlass was putting
pressure on him to get his land and that he was not about
to let anyone have it (Tr. Vol. I page 73).
On November 27, 1965, Mr. Rasmussen was readmitted to the hospital in Provo, Utah, and underwent
an operation on December 1, 1965. He was discharged
on December 8, 1965 and returned home. He went into
a coma on December 11, and was taken to the hospital
in Mount Pleasant, Utah and died there on December 13,
1965.
Defendants claim, and the Administrator disputes,
that Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen executed a warranty deed
dated December 1, 1965, and thereby conveyed 25 acres
of land to the defendant Ellsworth Wanless Rasmussen
(Exhibit 5). The Administrator alleged that the signature of James A. Rasmussen on the deed was a forgery,
contending that on the day the deed purported to be
signed and notarized in Ephraim, Mr. Rasmussen had
undergone an operation and was confined to a hospital
in Provo, Utah. This deed was recorded December 9,
1965, at the request of defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen.
The following day two additional deeds were recorded at the request of the defendant. One purported
to be a warranty deed from Sarah E. Rasmussen to W.
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Ellsworth Rasmussen conveying 7.13 acres (Exhibit 7).
The property described in the deed included the land
and home in which James A. and Sarah E. Rasmussen
were then living. The other deed (Exhibit 6) described
essentially the same tract. Although this deed was also
recorded December 10, 1965, it was dated July 9, 1954,
and purported to transfer the tract from James A. Rasmussen to his wife. The Administrator contended that
James A. Rasmussen had never delivered this deed to
his wife Sarah and that it was ineffective, and that, therefore, the deed from Sarah Rasmussen to Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen was also ineffective to transfer any interest inasmuch as Mrs. Rasmussen did not own the
property. The Administrator introduced at trial seven
additional deeds from James A. Rasmussen to his wife
Sarah all dated July 9, 1954. It was not disputed that
these deeds were never delivered to Sarah Rasmussen,
but rather remained at all times in the possession of Mr.
Rasmussen as did the property described therein.
Moreover, it was not disputed that at the time of
the purported tranfer from Sarah E. Rasmussen to the
defendant W. Ellsworth that Mrs. Rasmussen was 87
years old, that she was severely hard of hearing and had
much difficulty in seeing. The Administrator contended
that the December 10 (Exhibit 7) deed was executed
by her without knowledge of its nature and effect, and
that upon being informed of that she had apparently executed a deed conveying the home in which she and her
husband were living, she repudiated the transfer and attempted to have the property reconveyed.
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Additioinal issues at trial involved the transfer of
grazing permits and a bill of sale for cattle.
Exhibit 19 purports to be a transfer by James Rasmussen to Ellsworth W. Rasmussen of Forest Service
grazing permits as to 22 head of cattle. Exhibit 17 is a
bill of sale from James A. Rasmussen to defendant Ellsworth W. Rasmussen for 22 head of cattle. The face of
both documents indicate that they are signed by the
senior Mr. Rasmussen on December 9, 1965. The Administrator alleged that the signature on the grazing
permit and bill of sale were forgeries.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE 1954 DEED (EXHIBIT 6) WAS
NOT DELIVERED FROM JAMES A. RASMUSSEN TO HIS WIFE AND THEREFORE
INEFFECTIVE TO CONVEY REAL PROPERTY.
Defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen claims that
before his father's death his parents gave him a deed
dated July 9, 1954, purporting to transfer the family
home and several surrounding acres of land from James
A. Rasmussen to Sarah E. Rasmussen (Exhibit 6).
Defendants contend in Point I of their Brief on
Appeal that the trial court erred in determining that the
deed of July 9, 1954, (Exhibit 6) was not delivered by
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Mr. Rasmussen to his wife and, therefore, ineffective.
It is undisputed, however, that Exhibit 27 consists of 7
additional deeds all dated July 9, 1954, all of which purport to transfer property from James A. Rasmussen to
his wife Sarah Rasmussen. Defendants do not dispute
the fact that after 1954 Mr. Rasmussen retained all the
deeds among his own personal papers and that he continued in possession of all the property described, that
he farmed the property, that he worked the land, and
that he paid the taxes on the property.
Defendants' contention that there was effective delivery of Exhibit 6 is not based upon any delivery to
Sarah Rasmussen, but instead is based upon the possession of the defendant Wanlass Ellsworth who recorded
it. Defendants argue that the only evidence of how the
deed came into the possession of the defendant Wanlass
Ellsworth and how it subsequently became recorded was
defendant's own testimony. This testimony, however,
produced no evidence that would tend to show that James
Rasmussen ever delivered the deed to his wife. In fact,
the defendant himself testified that he had no knowledge
of the deed after 1954 and that he did not remember
which of his parents had given him the deed (Tr. Vol.
I pages 166, 196).
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED
THAT SARAH E. RASMUSSEN DID NOT
UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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WARRANTY DEED -(EXHIBIT 7) FROM
HERSELF TO DEFENDANT WANLESS
ELLSWORTH RASMUSSEN WHEN SHE
SIGNED IT.
On December 10, 1965, Wanlass Rasmussen recorded
a deed (Exhibit 7) purporting to transfer property from
his mother to himself. (This deed covered the same property as referred to in Exhibit 6 discussed in Point I above
with the exception of 1.01 acres which had been deeded
by Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen to the defendant Wanless
Ellsworth in 1963; this conveyance of 1,01 acres to the
defendant is not in dispute.)
With respect to Exhibit 7, the court made the following trial findings:
At the time of said purported transfer by
Warranty Deed of said property from Sarah E.
Rasmussen to defendant, the said Sarah E. Rasmussen did not own said property; that said
property was then, and at all times had been,
owned by her husband, James A. Rasmussen,
deceased (R. 143).
Further, the court finds that at the time the
said Sarah Rasmussen signed the deeds referred
to in Findings 15 and 16 above, she was advanced in years, being of the age of 87 years,
and was physically in poor health; that she
was hard of hearing and suffered from poor
vision so that she was unable either to hear
or see very well; was enfeebled in body and had
difficulty in caring for herself. The deed was
executed by her without knowledge as to its nature and effect, and she was not aware that she
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was purportedly transferring and conveying to
the defendant the property described in said
deeds particularly the home in which she and her
husband were then living. Neither transaction
was explained to her, and she was not advised of
the nature and effect of what she was doing. Nor
was she given an opportunity to receive advice
or counsel from anyone in respect thereto. Later,
upon being informed that she had apparently
executed a deed on the home to her son Ellsworth, she repudiated such purported transfer
and attempted to have the property reconveyed
by said defendant (R. at 154).
The following evidence supports these findings:
On December 14, 1965, the day after Mr. Rasmussen's funeral, there was a conversation in the Rasmussen
home among Mrs. Rasmussen and the three sons, Clinton,
Wanlass, and Kenneth. Clinton Rasmussen testified that
he had asked his mother whether she had given Wanlass
the property and she had answered, "No" (Tr. Vol. II
pages 307-308).
Subsequently, in April of 1966, the family members
met at Kenneth Rasmussen's home in Salt Lake City.
Ward Rasmussen took charge of the meeting and stated
that one purpose of the gathering was to ask Mrs. Rasmussen whether or not she had deeded or otherwise given
the said property to her son Wanlass — if she were to
say she had, the family was instructed to forget their
claim to the property, but if she denied this, Wanlass
was to release his claim to the property. At this time,
Clinton Rasmussen testified that Wanlass asked his
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mother, "You know you want me to have this property.
If I don't get it, I won't have any," and that Mrs. Rasmussen had answered, "No, Wan [Wanlass], I didn't give
you the property." Clinton Rasmussen further testified
that Wanlass told his mother that his dad had given him
the property some two or three years ago. Mrs. Rasmussen responded, "If he did, he never told me about it"
(Tr. Vol. I pages 83-85 and 144).
The eldest child of Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen, Ruby
Hill, testified that on the day following her father's funeral she had remained home with her mother while the
rest of the family members had attended another funreal.
At this time she had asked her mother whether she knew
that she had signed a deed conveying her home, and the
property it was on, to her son Wanlass and Mrs. Rasmussen had replied that she had signed no deeds and
had not given any deeds to her son Wanlass. She did
state that a man had come to her home; he had sat at
the table, but she could not see or hear him very well and
did not recognize him. Mrs. Rasmussen said that in the
presence of this man (apparently the notary) she had
signed some grazing permits which her son Wanlass told
her would be lost if she did not sign them (Tr. of first
trial Vol I pages 248-250, Vol. II 251). (This testimony
was admitted into evidence by stipulation at the second
trial.)
The fact that Mrs. Rasmussen had failing eyesight
and very poor hearing is not disputed. Moreover, defendants admit that Mrs. Rasmussen was in failing health
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and in a position to be dominated by her children (Respondents' Brief at 5). No one was in a better position
to dominate his mother during the period in question
than the defendant Wanlass Rasmussen. He lived next
door to his mother and she would have naturally trusted
and relied upon him during this period of her husband's
illness. Among other things she relied upon him in that
he prepared checks for her signature during her husband's
illness (Tr .Vol. II p. 282).
The evidence adduced at trial was that Mrs. Rasmussen was unaware of the nature and effect of the deed
and that she was not aware that the deed purported to
transfer and convey to the defendants the home in which
she and her husband were then living. There was no
evidence that the transaction was explained to her and
she was not advised of the nature and effect of what she
was doing. She was not given an opportunity to receive
counsel or advice from anyone except the defendant
Wanlass Rasmussen, and subsequently on being informed
that she had apparently executed a deed transferring
her home to Wanlass, she repudiated the transfer and
attempted to have the property reconveyed to her by
said defendant both orally and by a written statement
signed by her (Exhibit 20). After evaluating the credibility to be given each witness, the evidence establishing
these findings was ample for the trial court to make its
determination.

POINT III.
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE 1963 DEED (EXHIBIT 3) WAS GIVEN
TO DEFENDANT WANLASS RASMUSSEN
CONDITIONALLY AND THAT THE PROPERTY WOULD BE RECONVEYED UPON
REQUEST.
The admitted purpose of the transfer evidenced by
Exhibit 3 was to permit James Rasmussen's son, the defendant Wanlass Rasmussen, to use the property as security for a Farmers Home Administration loan (Appellants' Brief at 6). The administrator argues that
this transfer was conditional and was for the purpose
of obtaining financing only. This fact was substantiated
by the teBtimony of Clinton Rasmussen who testified
that his father told him that he had asked his son Wanlass to return the land, but that he had refused to do so.
Kenneth Rasmussen also testified that his father had told
him that Wanlass refused to reconvey the property. The
nature of the transaction is further clarified by the undisputed fact that Mr. Rasmussen continued to farm
the property, continued to exercise control over it, crop
the property, work on the property, and pay the taxes
on the property.
Defendants attempt to make much of the fact that
James A. Rasmussen had earlier required his son Wanless in return 10 acres before his son moved to Las Vegas,
which had been deeded to Wanlass in 1932 when 10 acres
had also been deeded both to Clinton and Kenneth. The
defendant admitted, however, that these deeds were not
meant as transfers (Tr. Vol. I page 274). And it is clear
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that Mr. Rasmussen intended to take care of the formality of having these sons deed these properties back to
him. In fact in 1954 deeds were prepared which would
have deeded this property back to Mr. Rasmussen (Exhibit 27). It is significant that neither Kenneth Rasmussen nor Clinton Rasmussen have claimed any interest
in the property pursuant to these deeds and that they
both have always recognized that the deeds were to be
used solely for the purpose of obtaining grazing permits.
Even the testimony of Wanlass Rasmussen substantiates the fact that the purported transfer of the ten acres
to Wanlass in 1963 was conditional:
Q. So far as you are concerned, if your
father had asked for that 10 acres back which
was deeded to you in 1963 if he [had] asked for
it back before he died, you would have given it
to him, wouldn't you?
A. Yes (Tr. Vol. I page 245).
Moreover, James Rasmussen had executed other
deeds which were undisputedly not intended to convey
property (Tr. Vol. I pages 158-159 and 274). This fact
lends further support to the finding that this particular
transfer was conditional. Even the testimony of the defendant offers Httle support for the argument that the
deed was given unconditionally.
The trial court heard the witnesses and evaluated
the credibility of each. The court's finding should be
affirmed.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE SIGNATURE OF JAMES A.
RASMUSSEN ON EXHIBIT 5 WAS A FORGERY.
Exhibit 5 purports to be a warranty deed transferring 25 acres from James A. Rasmussen and his wife to
the defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen. The administrator contended that the signature of James A.
Rasmussen had not been authored by him and the trial
court so held.
Robert F. Grube was called as an expert witness to
examine the signature of James A. Rasmussen on Exhibit 5 and to testify as to the author of the signature.
Mr. Grube had been employed by the United States
Secret Service for 33 years and defendants stipulated as
to his qualification as a handwriting expert. Comparing
signatures known to have been authored by James A,
Rasmussen with the signature on Exhibit 5, Mr. Grube
testified that the same person did not author the James
Rasmussen signature on Exhibit 5 (Tr. Vol. II page 375).
Mr. Grube also supplied the basis for his opinion, testifying in great detail on this point (Tr. Vol. II pages 375381).
To rebut Mr. Grube's testimony, defendants called
Edgar Anderson and McKay Anderson, cashiers at the
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Bank of Ephraim, to testify that they had witnessed Mr.
Rasmussen sign Exhibit 5.
Edgar Anderson admitted that Exhibit 5 could not
have been notarized by him on the date that the document shows because he had learned at the prior trial that
Mr. Rasmussen had undergone on operation and was
confined to a hospital on that date (Tr. Vol. II page 428).
Mr. Anderson admitted that sometimes deeds are
prepared and dated and sometimes not signed until later
(Tr. Vol. II page 427). But he said he would never back
date a deed (Tr. Val. II page 428). Mr. Anderson further
admitted that he had no recollection of the particular
transaction so that he could say that Mr. or Mrs. Rasmussen were present when he put his acknowledgment
on the deed (Tr. Vol. II page 437).
McKay Anderson, who also allegedly witnessed the
signature of Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen at the Rasmussen
home admitted that the only way he could remember
that he had witnessed Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen sign
Exhibit 5 was because he had been to the Rasmussen
home fo rthat purpose on only one occasion (Tr. Vol. II
page 443). Nevertheless, the witness was unable to explain whether it was Exhibit 5 which had in fact been
witnessed by him at the Rasmussen home or Exhibit 4
which purports to have been witnessed by him one year
earlier.
The weight to be given the testimony of Edgar and
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McKay Anderson to the effect that they had gone to
the Rasmussen home to witness the signatures on the
particular documents in question is further demonstrated
by the fact that Mr. Rasmussen did not return home
from the hospital until December 8, 1965. He went
into a coma on December 11th and the deed was
recorded December 9 by the defendant Wanlass Rasmussen at 2:00 p.m. This necessarily means that if
Mr. Rasmussen signed the deed, it was between the time
he arrived home in Ephraim on the 8th and before 2:00
p.m. on the 9th — seven or eight days after the deed
actually purports to have been signed and notarized.
Mr. Anderson admitted, however, that he might have
told attorney Udell Jensen in September of 1968 that the
deed was signed and notarized at the bank (necessarily
on the 8th or 9th) contrary to his testimony on direct
examination that the deed was signed at the Rasmussen
home (Tr. Vol. II page 431).
The clear testimony of Mr. Grube as to the handwriting of the signature and the unsure and confused
testimony of Messrs. Anderson, gave the trial court sufficient grounds to find that the signature was a forgery.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE AUTHOR OF THE SIGNATURE
OF JAMES A. RASMUSSEN ON EXHIBITS
16, 17, 18 AND 19 WAS NOT JAMES A. RASMUSSEN.
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Exhibits 16, 17, 18 and 19 purport to be two bills
of sale and two grazing permits transferring cattle and
grazing permits from James A. Rasmussen to the defendant Wanlass Rasmussen and his brother Roger Rasmussen. Roger Rasmussen has refused to accept the
purported transfer to himself. Wanlass Rasmussen claims
the transfer is valid. The trial court ruled as follows:
On the 9th or 10th day of December, 1965,
two documents entitled Bill of Sale and two documents entitled Waiver of Grazing Preference
were purportedly executed by the decedent
James A. Rasmussen involving cattle and range
permits which he at that time owned. One of
said Bills of Sale and Transfer of Grazing Permits was to defendant Ellsworth W. Rasmussen
and the other to Roger J. Rasmussen. Notwithstanding said documents appear to bear the signature of James A. Rasmussen, the Court finds
that said documents were not in fact executed
by the said James A. Rasmussen; that his signature thereon is a forgery; and that therefore
said Bills of Sale and Waivers are null and void,
and title to said cattle and grazing permits never
The Court further finds in respect thereto
that the said Roger J. Rasmussen has never
claimed the title to said cattle or grazing permits purported to be transferred to him.
As a consequence of said purported Bill of
Sale, defendant Ellsworth W. Rasmussen took
possession of 12 head of cattle and one bull on
or about the 13th day of December, 1965, which
belonged to the said James A. Rasmussen, de-
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ceased, and wrongfully converted the same to
his own use (R. 143-144).
To support this contention that the signatures on
the grazing permits were valid, defendants called L. R.
Burr, a retired automobile dealer in Ephraim, to testify
that he had notarized the James Rasmussen signature
on these documents. Although Mr. Burr testified that
he witnessed the signature he also testified to the contrary.
Q. I ask you if you have any recollection
that his signature was on there, or are you just
relying on your custom and practice?
A. I am relying on my custom and practice
(Tr. Vol. II page 470).
Q. Do you know whether there were any
signatures on the documents before you signed?
A. I don't know if there were or not (Tr.
Vol. II page 465).
Moreover, the documents were purportedly signed on
December 10, 1965, but Judy Westenskow Lott, a housekeeper who lived in the Rasmussen home during the
last illness of James A. Rasmussen, testified that when
Mr. Rasmussen returned from the hospital in December
of 1965, that he was too ill to sign checks (Tr. Vol. II
page 508).
Against the equivocal testimony of Mr. Burr and
Mrs. Lott, the trial court heard the testimony of Mr.
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Grube (whose qualifications to testify as an expert was
stipulated to by defendants) that the signatures on these
documents were not authored by the same person who
had authored other signatures which were accepted as
the genuine signature of James Rasmussen (Tr. Vol. II
page 375).
The trial court weighed the credibility of each witness and, contrary to the contention of defendants, the
court was not compelled to find the testimony of defendants' witnesses as 100 per cent credible on every
point while disregarding plaintiff's testimony. The trial
court's finding was correct.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's finding that there existed a confidential relationship between Sarah Rasmussen and her
son, the defendant, Wanlass Ellsworth Rasmussen was
apparently based inter alia upon the following facts: Mrs.
Rasmussen's husband became seriously ill in November
and December of 1965; she was severely hard of hearing
and had failing eyesight; her health was so poor that she
was unable to visit her husband in the hospital (Tr. Vol.
II page 507); her handwritting was so shaky she usually
had to have someone guide her hand; the defendant made
out checks for his mother to sign on behalf of his father
while he was in the hospital (Tr. Vol. II page 282) and
during the illness and hospitalization of her husband, Mrs.
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Rasmussen needed help and accepted care from the defendant because he lived next door and she had apparent
trust and confidence in him.
Moreover, as soon as Mrs. Rasmussen learned of the
purported transfer she repudiated it at a family gathering
with the defendant present and also in a written statemeat (Exhibit 20).
It is plaintiffs' position that the relationship between
Sarah E. Rasmussen and her son Wanlass Ellsworth was
"such as would lead an ordinary prudent person in the
management of his business affairs to repose that degree
of confidence in the other person which largely results
in the substitution of the will of the latter for that of
the former." Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 U. 2d 378, 383,
401 P. 2d 710 (1965).
Based upon this confidential relationship it was defendant's burden to convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the gifts and conveyances
were fair. Johnson v. Johnson, 9 U. 2d 40, 337 P. 2d 420
(1959). Instead, it is clear that plaintiffs have proved the
reverse — that the transactions were not fair.
With respect to the James Rasmussen signature as
well as the other evidence, the trial court was in the advantageous position of being present to evaluate the testimony and its credibility. Not only does the record reveal
that there is substantial evidence to support the trial
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court's ruling, but a review of the record reveals to the
reader that the evidence clearly preponderates for the
findings made by the court.
Respectfully submitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen
Earl Jay Peck
NIELSEN, CONDER,
HANSEN & HENRIOD
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Udell R. Jensen
Nephi, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Respondents
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